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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
KEITH NORTH, by and through his ~ 
Guardian Ad Litem, C. E. NORTH, 
Plainti.ff and Appellant, 
\ Case No. 7457 
vs. I 
C. H. CARTWRIGHT, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This suit was brought by the appellant Keith North, by 
and through his guardian ad litem, C. E. North, against the 
Respondent, C. H. Cartwright, to recover damages for personal 
injuries sustained by the appellant as the result of the respond-
ent's driving an automobile against the appellant and the 
motor scooter he, with another person: was operating the 
collision occurring on First South Street immediately west of 
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the intersection of Regent Street. At the close of the trial the 
court directed a verdict of no cause of action, and this. appeal 
was taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant in ·his brief has asserted that this case does 
not involve an intersection accident. We submit to the court 
at the outset that the actual collision occurred at a point 
twenty-one ( 21) feet west on First South Street from the west 
curb line of Regent Street (R. 108), yet it is our position that 
this fact notwithstanding, the rights, duties, and liabilities of 
the parties arise out of their relative positions at the inter-
section of First South Street and Regent Street. At said place 
in the center of First South Street the center lines were broken 
to the west of Regent Street so that an automobile turning 
west could take a northwest direction from Regent Street 
entering First South Street, Regent Street being a narrow street. 
At the time defendant was well within his traffic lane and 
would have crossed the center of First South east of where 
the line was broken and in his proper traffic position. Ap-
pellant, a boy of seventeen ( 17), was operating a small 
motor scooter commonly known as a "doodle bug" (Ex-
hibit A) in a westerly direction on First South Street at a 
speed of about ten miles per hour (R. 46). Seated behind 
him on the scooter was Robert Cox, age' fourteen ( 14) (R. 
33-34). Respondent was operating a Chrysler sedan motor 
vehicle in a northerly direction on Regent Street. Respondent 
stopped at a stop sign on Regent Street and First South Street 
( R. -51) and after having look twice to the left and once to 
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the right to observe aproaching traffic, he proceeded slowly 
and cautiously (R. 145) out into the intersection at a speed 
of between five and eight miles per hour in order to make a 
left tum down First South Street (R. 1 'S..!) When respondent 
had reached a point twenty-one ( 21) feet west of the west 
curb line of Regent Street and approximately four ( 4) feet 
south of the center line of First South Street he collided with 
appellant. 
Appellant contends in his statement of facts that at the 
time the parties were in the positions outlined above, traffic 
on First South was heavy, however, the testimony at the trial 
below indicated that the only traffic upon said street was a Salt 
Lake City Lines bus proceeding west on First South Street 
(R. 154). 
Appellant in his brief contends that the appellant was 
driving his vehicle close to the center of the white middle line 
on First South Street and on the north side of said center line 
(R. 92) . Yet the testimony offered and received at the trial 
below abundantly showed that at the point of impact appellant's 
position was approximately four ( 4) feet south of the center 
line of said street (R. 127, R. 108). Further, the testimony 
below showed that only a second or so before_ the impact oc-
curred the Cox boy, who was the first to observe the respondent, 
shouted to the appellant, "look out, Keith," whereupon he 
jumped off the vehicle (R. 35). At this time the appellant's 
motor scooter was traveling straight forward in a westerly 
direction (R. 45). The collision followed instantaneously 
after the Cox boy jumped off the appellant's vehicle (R. 35). 
l~ppellant testified in an attempt to explain his position on the 
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south side of the center line at the point of impact that when 
Cox jumped off his scooter his movement in leaving the 
vehicle caused it to be "pushed a little" (R. 40) and that 
thereafter sufficient time elapsed to enable his vehicle to travel 
across the center line at an angle to the point of impact (R. 93). 
Prior to the impact the appellant got a fleeting glimpse of the 
respondent through his rear view mirror (R. 59). 
After the impact the respondent's vehicle stopped instant-
aneously of its own accord (R. 165), whereupon, the Cox 
boy shouted to the respondent to "back up" (R. 155). Re-
spondent backed his vehicle approximately three to four feet 
(R. 155) dragging appellant and his vehicle which had some-
how become engaged with the front bumper of respondent's 
car. 
The right front bumper of respondent's car contacted 
the motor scooter (R. 41) on the left rear side (R. 35, 56). 
There were gouge marks indicating where the scooter had been 
dragged by the backing operation, which marks were loc_ated 
twenty-one ( 21) feet west of the west side of Regent Street 
and eight (8) feet south of the double line (R. 108). The 
extent and nature of appellant's injuries are not material here. 
It was stipulated at the trial that the following ordinance 
of Salt Lake City was in full force and effect. Section 6128 
(c) 3, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1944: 
"The driver of a vehicle shall like,~.rise stop in obedi-
ence to a stop sign as required herein at an intersection 
where a stop sign is erected at one or more entrances 
thereto although not a part of a through highway and 
shall proceed cautiously, yielding to vehicles not so 
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obligated to stop which are within the intersection or 
are approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate 
hazard, but may then proceed." 
In summary, it is clear that the appellant was traveling 
on the south side of the center line of First South Street in 
a straight southwesterly course. The respondent came slowly 
and cautiously out into the intersection, and while the respond-
ent was executing a left turn a collision occurred between the 
vehicles. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH APPELLANT 
RELIES. 
Point I. The respondent's negligence was clear and un-
disputed. 
Point II. The appellant was not contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. The respondent's negligence was clear and un-
disputed. 
No argument submitted. 
Point II. The appellant was contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law. 
We subq1it to the court that the evidence abupdantly shows 
that the appellant was guilty of contributory negligence, that 
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the negligent acts and omissions of the appellant were the 
proximate cause of the collision, and that the cumulative 
weight of the testimony justified the trial court in holding as 
a matter of law that the appellant's own negligence barred 
his recovery. 
The conclusion must surely follow from the facts estab-
lished at the trial that the appellant's motor vehicle was being 
driven at least four ( 4) feet south of the center line of the 
street. First, the impact occurred at this point. Second, by 
appellant's own admission, and that ?f his passenger, Cox, the 
vehicle was traveling in a straight westerly direction at the 
time Cox jumped off. He jumped only a split second before the 
collision occurred. It appears impossible of belief by any 
reasonable mind that the appellant's vehicle, while traveling 
only ten miles per hour could have, with the space of a second, 
crossed over the white center line of the street and traveled 
four ( 4) feet south to the point of impact, if in fact the 
appellant had been traveling on the north side of the street. 
Respondent, after stopping for the stop sign on Regent 
Street, looked twice to the left and once to the right before 
proceeding out into the intersection. He observed an approach-
ing Salt Lake City Lines bus and yielded to it) and he then 
proceeded slowly and cautiously into the intersection after it 
had passed. We submit that any reasonable view of the evi-
d~nce indicates that respondent would have likewise yielded 
to the appellant had the appellant been in a position where 
respondent could reasonably be expected to observe him. 
Having looked twice to the left and having observed no 
traffic approaching from the south side of the line, and after 
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yielding to traffic approaching from the right on the north 
side of the line, it is unreasonable to require the respondent 
to likewise search the south side of the street on respondent's 
right to observe approaching traffic coming down the wrong 
side of the street. 
· Title 57, Chapter 7,'"Section 120 of the Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1934 provides that: 
"Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle 
shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway." 
In construing this statute the Supreme Court of Utah has 
held in several cases, Staton vs. Western Macaroni Mfg. Co., 
174 Pac. 82 ~' being only one that: 
"The strongest kind of a presumption of negligence 
prevails against the party driving on the wrong side 
of the road." 
The explanation offered by the appellant as to his presence 
on the south side of the line at the point of impact in no way 
destroys the weight of this presumption. Rather, his conduct 
in permitting the passenger Cox to ride the vehicle at all and in 
permitting a chain of forces to be set in motion forcing ·the 
vehicle over to the south side of the street when Cox jumped 
off, assuming that these were the facts, constitutes further 
negligence on hi~ part. 
Section 57-7-169.11 and section 57-7-169.12 of Utah Ses-
sion Laws of 1949 provide as follows: 
"A person operating a motor vehicle or a motor 
driv~n vehicle shall ride only upon the permanent and 
regular seat attached thereto, and such operator shall 
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not carry any other person, nor shall any other person 
ride on a motor vehicle unless such vehicle is designed 
to carry more than one person." 
"No person shall ride and no person driving a motor 
vehicle shall knowingly permit any person to ride upon 
any portion of any vehicle not designed or intended 
for the use of passengers." 
'X! e submit that the violation of any one or both of the 
above statutes by the appellant constitutes further and addi-
tional negligence upon his part. 
Appellant in his brief has called to the Court's attention 
the recent case of Conklin vs. Walsh, 193 P. 2d 436, and the 
recent case of Hickok vs. Skinner, 190 P. 2d 514, and has at-
tempted to distinguish these cases and their holdings from the 
case at bar. It is admitted that the factual situations presented 
by these two cases differ somewhat from the case at bar, but 
we submit to the Court that the fundamental governing rules 
of law established by these cases apply likewise in this case. 
In each of the above cited cases, this Court held that the 
appellant, favored driver, was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law for failing to reappraise his position upou 
the highway with respect to that of the disfavored driver and 
to govern himself accordingly as a reasonable man. The 
court in the Conklin case, supra, in holding that the appellant 
was guilty of conributory negligence as a matter of law said: 
"The duty to keep a proper lookout applies as well 
to the favored as to the disfavored driver. Neither 
driver can excuse his own failure to observe because th\: 
other driver failed in his duty. Neither driver is at any 
time to be excused for want of vigilance or failure to 
10 
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see what is plain to be seen. Drivers are permitted to 
cross over arterial highways after having stopped. True, 
they must yield the right-of-way to cars which are close 
enough to constitute an immediate hazard This rule, 
however, requires the exercise of some judgment. It 
is still the duty on the part of the driver traveling the 
arterial highway to remain reasonably alert to the 
proximity of the disfavored driver starting across the 
intersection in the belief that he can cross in safety. 
The duty of keeping a proper lookout attends all those 
operating motor vehicles and other ru.les of the road 
do not relieve any driver of the necessity of complying 
with this requirement." 
In Hickok vs. Skinner, supra, this Court quoted with ap-
proval the case of Driefus vs. Levy, La., ~pp., 140 So. 259, 263, 
and announced the governing rule of law to be that: 
"The mere fact that the truck driver entered the 
intersection first did not justify him in proceeding with--
out caution and care, totally disregarding the oncoming 
car which he had seen, and he could have easily dis~ 
covered by looking that whatever rights he had by 
virtue of entering the intersection first were not going 
to be respected by the other car. He should not have 
advanced into the pathway of the other car, and by 
doing so, was guilty of negligence." Huddy's Enc. of 
Automobile law, (9th Ed.) Vol. 3-4, p. 278; Buckner 
v. Powers, 125 So. 774. 
We submit that in the case at bar we have an even stronger 
application of the rules announced in the Conklin and Hickok 
cases, for the reason that while in those cases the appellant 
traveling at a fairly rapid rate of speed, maintained sufficient 
lookout to observe the position of the disfavored driver at 
some distance from the point of impact; in the case at bar, the 
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appellant was traveling at a very slow rate of speed and yet 
did not maintain sufficient lookout to observe the respondent 
at the stop sign until the collision was unavoidable. The ap-
pellant's total failure . to maintain a proper lookout which 
would enable him to observe the respondent and to govern his 
movements in relation thereto, though he had more than ample 
opportunity to do as brings him well within the purvue of the 
Conklin and Hickok cases. 
CONCLUSION 
It is well settled that negligence as a matter of law exists 
when the conduct of the party in question causes all reasonable 
minds to conclude that said conduct has fallen below the 
standard established by law to protect against unreasonable 
risks of harm. This Court has announced the governing 
standard of reasonable conduct as to the factual situation at 
hand. We submit that the conduct of the appellant surely 
causes all reasonable minds to conclude that the appellant was 
negligent, and justified the trial court in holding that said 
negligence was established as a matter of Ia:w barring his 
recovery. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIELDS & SHIELDS 
JOHN T. VERNIER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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